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by Paul Schulte 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
This paper considers contradictions between Alliance strategic cultures and underlying strategic 
realities, and how they might be better reconciled in the interests of improving—or simply 
maintaining—NATO deterrence. It does not pretend that deterrence is the only perspective from 
which to view Alliance security, but it does argue that there is a logic of deterrence with consistent 
policy implications that should not simply be glossed over. It also assumes that there is a moral 
as well as an intellectual obligation to consider, very seriously, deterrence as a responsible 
strategy which can prevent reckless aggression and avoidable spirals of conflict. 
Definitions 
In this paper deterrence is defined as “a coercive strategy involving the potential or actual 
application of force to influence the actions of others by seeking to discourage or restrain them 
from acting through considerations of danger, cost and risk.”[1] 
Although it is a boundary-setting activity which seldom occurs alone, but as part of a wider mix of 
messages of reassurance, conciliation and outreach, deterrence should be distinguished within 
that mixture from associated or parallel consensual persuasive strategies which (if they could be 
achieved) would involve the adjustment of strategic choices by others without the threat of force 
or other penalties. 
Strategic Cultural Context 
Serious discussion of deterrence is currently an unnatural conversation throughout most of 
NATO. The underlying reasons for this are complex. But they have to do with the strategic culture 
which has developed within Alliance member states.[2] 
These cultures are increasingly cautious, commendably humanitarian, but with little desire to 
consider the implications of worst-case security outcomes and of entirely foreseeable collisions of 
global power interests. Unkind, usually American, observers say that this attitude amounts to 
requesting an exemption from History. Indeed Raymond Aron wrote as early as the 1970s that 
‘‘Europeans would like to exit from history, from la grande histoire, from the history that is written 
in letters of blood. Others, by their hundreds of millions, wish to enter it.”[3] That aphorism 
describes the present situation even more aptly, although the yearning is not entirely confined to 
Europeans. The majority of Alliance citizens would prefer their governments to banish risk by 
creative use of soft power rather than contain or deter it by harder strategic capabilities or 
intentions. Millions would rather their representatives concentrated on climate change, world 
poverty or the credit crunch than potential military risks. 
Current and Recurrent Objections to Deterrence 
Furthering this public mood are arguments from politicians, diplomats, scholars and activists 
against an overdependence upon deterrence which overlap with a moral critique of deterrence 
itself, at least as practised by powerful and well-armed Western states. 
Critics variously allege that deterrence: 
• Accentuates distrust between nations;  
• Promotes militarism within them;  
o Is endless, and endlessly expensive, and benefits military-industrial complexes at 
the expense of real human welfare; and  
o Is subject to strategic misunderstanding, through recurrent , quite identifiable, 
mechanisms of human error such as misperception, worst-case thinking, poor 
strategic communication, mirror imaging, group think, and perserveration (i.e. 
insisting on maintaining a policy direction when there is accumulating evidence 
that it would be imprudent to do so).  
o Because of this proneness to error, critics argue, deterrence can never be risk-
free and must, statistically, therefore eventually tip over into disaster—as the 
supreme statistician McNamara reiterated to the very end of his life.  
o Deterrence presents risks such as misuse for reasons of domestic political 
popularity, and hijacking by populists or ideological extremists.  
o Deterrence can lead to repetitive wars of reputation. ”For a great nation there are 
no small conflicts,” as Lord Palmerston said, referring to a tiny revolt in Canada 
in 1837. Or, as Thomas Schelling put it in the 1960s, “Face is one of the few 
things worth fighting over." This raises the theoretical prospect of repeated 
conflicts to restore deterrence, such as Israel in Lebanon in 2006;  
o Deterrence produces hostile and distrustful relationships, which the U.S. 
government, for example, explicitly judges undesirable with major powers such 
as Russia and China.  
o A strongly emphasised deterrent posture, when signalled by a global military 
hegemon and its partners, might begin to look threateningly coercive, 
especially when supplemented with missile defences.  
o For the United States and its NATO partners to overstress deterrence risks 
undermining international institutions and regimes to the extent that they are 
seen to be providing security essentially for themselves, independently of the 
UN Security Council’s authority, and de-linked from enforcement of wider 
global norms.  
o It would set a bad example, the critics further assert, for the richest and 
collectively overwhelmingly most powerful nations in the world to 
overemphasise deterrence, especially by nuclear means, when their own 
overall strategic situation is so favourable.  
o Maintaining unyielding deterrence against current, or non-existent but indefinitely 
imaginable, opponents can only be achieved at the expense of disarmament.  
o Failure to secure wider nuclear disarmament, the critics conclude, increases the 
risk of the further progressive failure of the non-proliferation regime—which 
would, in turn, lead to a multiplication of nuclear deterrence relationships in 
places and with institutions, leaders, and forces which may be far less stable 
than those which the NATO Alliance has had to envisage to date. 
In general, for the Alliance in its current circumstances, a revised communicative emphasis on 
deterrence risks provoking accusations of being too much for its rather large surrounding 
neighborhood, because its aggregates of strength are too huge, undiscriminating and difficult to 
tailor. 
There is consequently a growing uncertainty about what can be said to Alliance publics without 
disproportionate political cost and embarrassment to member governments, especially those 
composed of fragile coalitions. The effect has been strengthened by the long-term tendency for 
publics and the media to assume that deterrence concerns only nuclear strategy, coupled with an 
understandable recent presentational overemphasis by governments on terrorism, which most 
ordinary people would probably therefore now define as the most serious threat facing the 
Alliance. This has decreased public willingness to consider the importance of averting war, 
blackmail or crisis between states. 
As a consequence, specialist analyses of deterrence differ so much from standard political 
discourse in each of the NATO countries that they may have to be translated into words which 
are less precise and more comforting. The work at NATO Headquarters on the new Strategic 
Concept announced at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009 will inevitably involve locating 
and working around the various special, perhaps show-stopping, national sensitivities in this 
regard. An Alliance of 28 members embodies a great many taboos. The eventual document will 
therefore have to be a masterful work of multilingual translation—and perhaps euphemism. In 
some areas circumlocution and tortured diplomatic formulas may be permissible; in others, 
precision could be essential. If there are to be trade-offs of deterrence against other policy 
considerations, it would be very desirable to set out scrupulously the extent and source of the 
expected gains from the trade. 
Living in Year One 
One might describe the present political conjunction as Year One AB (“After Bush”). The former 
U.S. Administration is now reviled for having overestimated the utility of military force. By 
contrast, NATO electorates see President Obama as an agent of profound change, committed to 
reducing military threats and confrontation. Major transformations are expected. His April 2009 
Prague speech created many rhapsodic expectations about the achievability of global nuclear 
disarmament. Yet, even on the most optimistic assumptions about the Obama Presidency, two 
complete presidential terms may be unable to eliminate the most serious threats to international 
security, which now seem to lie in nuclear proliferation. 
If diplomacy fails to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to Iran or elsewhere, and the 
use of force is also to be avoided, the unavoidable third option will be indefinite deterrence and 
containment in a world with nuclear weapons—as the President has cautiously said that it may 
remain for the rest of his lifetime. That may be the reality not only in relation to Iran but in various 
other crosscutting strategic relationships, should Iranian intransigence release a cascade of 
further nuclear proliferation. 
This is the contradictory context, where strategic cultural expectations contrast with intractable 
security disputes, in which NATO will have to construct its new Strategic Concept. It is 
understandable that the Alliance took the decision to launch this project. Its leaders have to 
reinterpret to their electorates the purpose of the Alliance in new times if it is to remain relevant 
and convincing to them, and therefore cohesive and resilient. 
But there are all too predictable presentational problems: 
• Discussing Options involves considering theatres of operations, military choices and 
therefore at least approximate identification of possible opponents.  
• Discussing Capabilities, while easier in some ways, still involves costs, which will conflict 
painfully with domestic priorities. How can NATO governments justify these costs 
without frightening and antagonizing voters? 
So transparent public discussion and consensus building will be difficult. The problem is not just a 
strategic one of reconciling political and military factors and trying to reconnect different strategic 
levels with a positive balance for each. It also requires developing a sufficiently compelling and 
accurate set of public formulations which can give adequate strategic guidance by addressing the 
most difficult and controversial issues, yet which is not excessively politically costly and divisive in 
its impact across the 28 NATO nations. 
Public Requirements for the Alliance's Strategic Conversation 
One particular semantic consideration will be important here. It would be undesirable to give any 
suggestion of planning to deter evil, which would take the debate in unnecessarily controversial 
directions and would be rejected by large sections of NATO's various publics. 
The Alliance's conversation with itself has to take into account opponents who would consider 
harming us not because they are intrinsically wicked, or because they hate us—though some 
might—but for historically quite normal motives such as increasing relative national power, 
mistakenly reacting to misperceived signals, courting domestic political popularity, reversing 
historic wrongs, or advancing a sanctified national, cultural or religious cause. 
That dispassionate long-term deterrent perspective, necessary to remain prudently engaged with 
history, inevitably involves many  "mights." As a result incautiously worded public statements 
which might be based on it could backfire rhetorically in the current mood and easily lend 
themselves to mockery or denunciation as the "Rent-a-Threat" thinking of “securicrats.” Strategic 
studies specialists have to believe that decision-makers cannot responsibly avoid hedging against 
future worst case mights. But ordinary citizens can, and some successful political leaders often 
do, disregard this responsibility. The subject matter of this paper is unnatural because the 
populations of NATO nations strongly prefer to think of peace. They do not wish to live, and 
therefore wish to avoid thinking about living, under the dangerous shadows of severely 
destructive conventional or nuclear war or even intense terrorist attack. 
But, for specialists and officials concerned with Alliance security, the less comfortable 
requirement is for hard collective thinking, careful planning, and appropriate procurement and 
training, coupled with sophisticated political signaling aimed at showing that NATO is clearly 
willing and able to thwart and, if necessary, punish other actors in the international system, 
whether states or non-state groups, which might otherwise find it expedient to do harm to one or 
more of the 28 NATO Allies. 
Alliance Deterrence: Ideally Unified Vision and Presently Disconnected 
Reality 
What overall policy and communications outcome should these efforts ideally aim at? The 
following formulation of a satisfactory end state will by definition never be completely achievable 
but its requirements can sharpen analysis: 
“a widely agreed and well communicated menu of civil and military responses to possible 
state and non-state aggression, including new technological threats, and covert challenges 
below Article 5 levels, which would in aggregate promise to be: 
•  
o credible,  
o proportionate,  
o discriminating,  
o effective, and  
o legal.” 
If this agenda were successfully developed and determinedly maintained, it would provide a 
deeply stabilising and cooling antidote to our current situation, in which we risk having 
Disconnectedly Stratified Deterrence, with significant separation between the following levels: 
1. Nuclear: These capabilities are politically, symbolically and, in crises, nationally and 
psychologically important. Adjustments in nuclear forces are generally slow in technical 
and numerical terms, unless there are radical cuts. Nuclear deterrence requirements 
are subject to radical change by the appearance of new nuclear-capable states, 
although these might be mitigated to an uncertain degree by missile defenses within 
the Alliance.  
2. High-End Conventional: These capabilities include armored divisions, air wings, 
submarines and aircraft carriers. In NATO terms the likely overall military balances are 
satisfactory but there remain suspicions about the Alliance’s political commitment to 
the conventional defense of the territory of the newest, most peripheral, and therefore 
most exposed members—or, still more, to the costly and forceful ejection of 
aggression.  
3. Unconventional, non-military, and “jagged" threats, including internal and cross-border 
tensions and conflict involving nonstate actors: Fast moving and unpredictable 
developments, like magma bubbling below the other strategic strata, could involve 
rogue states, international terrorism and great power adventurism and probing. Murky 
and ambiguous possibilities could draw in a variety of obscure and unfamiliar decision-
makers. 
"Jagged Threats" and Necessary Deterrent Remedies 
Serious consideration of this last category suggests that the Alliance should modify and expand 
its focus to look at the increasingly important sub-military components of deterrence. That should 
not detract or distract from the case for nuclear or conventional military deterrence but ought to 
embed them in an integrated Alliance Vision for security. NATO needs to be able to deter not 
only, or even predominantly, cross border military attacks or nuclear strikes, but also less 
tangible, more insidious threats and risks. If, despite accounting for around 67 percent of the 
world’s military expenditure,[4] an alliance of over 800 million rich and exceptionally well armed 
people can find no deterrent remedies for these new threats, the Allies risk losing confidence in 
the usefulness of the island of collective defense they have constructed from the maelstrom of 
twentieth-century history and the sense of mutual obligation it requires and justifies. 
Actors too weak or too cautious to threaten NATO with overt conventional attack may employ 
jagged methods of assertion. This category of deterrable risk involves an unpredictable variety of 
pressures, constraints and challenges, sometimes anonymous, unattributable, uncertain or 
disputed (possibly thrown up by Mother Nature like swine flu— or, in future, quite possibly not). 
They could result from decisions by unsympathetic governments, or allegedly independent state 
owned agencies, and they might be justified by alleged economic or technical necessity, or health 
risks. 
Jagged assertion might take place in, or concertedly across, a number of environments, including 
entirely new technological domains.[5] 
• In space, where satellites are increasingly crucial, for civil as well as military applications, 
but might be jammed, blinded or even destroyed without any other terrestrial military 
aggression;  
• In cyberspace, where national economies can be brought to a halt by anonymous 
hackers and massive denial of service attacks and where some Alliance members 
have already experienced cyber bombardments;  
• Within civil society and public opinion through externally directed riots and civil disorder, 
as took place recently in Estonia;  
• In the energy sector, through stoppages and cut-offs, a sector in which the NATO Allies 
are all uneasily aware of the dependencies which they are continually accumulating 
through hydrocarbon imports;  
• At sea, which might involve scenarios as different as:  
o Piracy in unpoliced Third World waters, where naval forces entirely militarily 
capable of protecting the sea lanes are “self-deterred” from taking forceful 
action by legal considerations;  
o Menacing naval manoeuvres off the coasts of Europe; or  
o Rough games of flag-waving naval “chicken” in the High North as the Arctic ice 
sheet melts and various littoral countries assert their claims; and 
• Within the human terrain of our societies, by selectively permitted or actively manipulated 
human flows of economic migrants or alleged refugees. 
Jagged assertion could also take place through terrorism. Despite the endless attention to this 
issue since 9/11, the NATO Allies are far from any authoritative indication of red lines. Deterrence 
theory would suggest that it would be a stabilizing development to convey clear and firm 
messages. What degree of evidence or scale of uncovered plots and intended terrorist attacks 
should trigger NATO responses by military, economic or political punishment for sponsorship or 
tolerance by hostile or deliberately negligent regimes? 
What would happen if Canada or one of the European Allies were to suffer an assault of the 
magnitude of the World Trade Center or Mumbai attacks, or a weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) incident? (The United States has its new expanded retaliatory policy but this points up the 
gap with other allied doctrines.) What should be the proper collective response to a number of 
small scale, deliberately non-catastrophic terror attacks, perhaps using chemical, biological or 
radiological materials, to terrify NATO populations and build up habituated expectations of future 
threats connected with Alliance decisions? Or, as an increasingly imaginable terrorist scenario, 
what should the Alliance do if one or more of its members begins to suffer frequent small-scale 
missile attacks, like those which repeatedly struck Israel from Gaza? 
It is essential that the Alliance think through and work hard on agreeing, preparing and, as far as 
possible, signaling responses well in advance to this proliferating category of challenges. If it 
becomes evident that NATO is failing to prepare itself to cope with such jagged threats, member 
states may make other accommodations, while widening public disillusionment could wear away 
belief in the utility of the Alliance—and correspondingly dissolve the external credibility of its will 
to defend itself. 
New and Wider Deterrent Options 
We therefore need wider spectrums and smoother gradations of deterrent plans and capabilities. 
Some might have to be entirely new and innovative. Others are already beginning to be 
introduced. The possibilities include: 
• More convincingly combined and determined diplomatic pressures;  
• More reliably concerted economic measures, like retaliatory sanctions, including 
prolonged and shared disinvestment;  
• Cyber protective or retaliatory responses;  
• Fall back plans for replacing and sharing space assets;  
• Coordinated medical preparations and stockpiles;  
• Demonstrations of solidarity with exposed allies on the Alliance’s periphery (which one 
might think of as NATO's geopolitical “Hemland”), as with the Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) set up in Estonia;  
• The evident capability and plausible will to launch conventional interventions to block 
attacks by—or to punish—recklessly aggressive hostile regimes; and  
• Legal initiatives which would begin to extricate policymakers from the expanding thicket 
of judge-made international law. 
The Public Case for Reintegrating Deterrence 
The connection between remedies against jagged threats and conventional or nuclear deterrence 
needs to be communicated more effectively. A publicly successful argument would need to be 
carefully refined, but might, in essence, run like this: 
1. The Alliance needs to develop deterrent responses to emergent, unconventional or 
jagged threats in order to be able to protect its security interests.  
2. Allies cannot reasonably expect self declaredly hostile or competitor nations with a 
burning sense of historical grievance, military encirclement, or religious entitlement, to 
accept being thwarted in their jagged assertion efforts without at least threatening 
some quite possibly unspecified kind of military response.  
3. If there is a possibility of military conflict, the Allies cannot reasonably expect 
opponents, whoever they might be, to accept the prospect of tidy conventional defeat, 
without at least threatening escalation to use of WMD, if they have them (or perhaps 
even if they don't).  
4. To deter such threats the Allies need not just capable and usable conventional forces, 
but, at the anxiety provoking top end, convincing nuclear capabilities, including those in 
the long-established sharing arrangements under NATO auspices.  
5. For this, numbers, assured penetration, and weapon yield matter, but not as much as 
demonstrably cohesive will power. These are, after all, as the Allies have frequently 
stated, political weapons. 
Missile Defense in Europe 
Missile defense in Europe could help to preserve and enhance that willpower across the Alliance. 
A European interceptor site should foster more determination in a crisis with a small nuclear 
power because it would offer the realistic prospect that the ballistic missile would not always get 
through. Therefore the enhanced psychological reassurance of Alliance publics should further 
enhance deterrence. 
But the extent of this contribution may depend on the quality of advocacy, tactical handling and 
political leadership. In purely deterrence terms, there is a significant risk that, if mishandled, 
disputes over installing missile defenses for the protection of Allied territory and populations 
outside the United States could use up more political capital and strategic determination than the 
missile defenses would create or conserve. 
The Impact of Arms Control on Alliance Nuclear Deterrence 
Western publics, especially in this Year One AB, will demand that NATO governments be seen to 
be contributing positively to progress in arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Even from a 
deterrence standpoint there would be no point in resisting this. The alternative would be to risk 
bitter intra-alliance political divisions which would reduce the political cohesion desirable to deter 
reckless challengers. So NATO will continue to make supportive statements and to examine its 
own requirements. It should especially contribute money and technical expertise for devising 
verification modalities—the predictable devil which will haunt any deep or long-term progress. 
But each specific arms-control proposal will need to be carefully examined. This is perhaps where 
strategists can come out of their disciplinary closet and engage—or contribute to better informed 
speeches for others to do so. Articulate analysis of these issues gives specialists a small but 
worthwhile chance to affect the development of the national strategic cultures within the Alliance. 
Experts should therefore at least ask questions such as the following: 
• How would a specific disarmament proposal actually work to move the whole world—not 
just the small Circle of the Virtuous—closer to zero?  
• Does the proposal in question require a leap of faith, starting the Alliance on a lone 
expedition towards the elusive summit of nuclear abolition, towards a base camp from 
which it could not easily withdraw if the international weather deteriorated?  
• Would the combination of possible disarmament proposals risk unravelling the Alliance 
(which would be a disaster, given European propensities for distrust and rivalry)?  
• On the issue of the “200 to 300"[6] U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe permitting nuclear 
burden sharing by European Allies operating the necessary dual capable aircraft, it is 
necessary to ask determinedly, what alternatives might be better than the present 
system? 
It is now clear that at the May 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), some of the non-nuclear weapon states will press strongly for the 
abolition of this carefully developed NATO arrangement, which was established well before the 
conclusion of the NPT. The analysis of disarmament options therefore needs to go beyond the 
strategic level to encompass the political, psychological, and ethical implications. A proper 
concern for the maintenance of deterrence would require an adequate answer to the following 
questions: 
• What other modalities could improve, or even equal, the sharing of political commitments 
and practical nuclear responsibilities among the NATO Allies in the current 
arrangements?  
• In terms of deterrence, which other arrangement could be more operationally stable in a 
crisis than a system of nuclear burden sharing which, because it would depend upon 
the achievement of an Alliance consensus, could never in practice be used for a 
preemptive surprise first strike?  
• Is it likely that increasing the nuclear dependence of the European Allies on the United 
States by doing away with current nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing 
arrangements would enhance European willingness to develop and maintain 
expeditionary military capabilities which could be used for global benefit?  
• Why exactly should the European Allies signal that they now expect to shift the nuclear 
deterrent responsibility further on to the United States, implying that they themselves 
decline to support a jointly-maintained capability that has become distasteful to nuclear 
disarmament proponents?  
• Can only the Americans, in the last resort, be expected to take the political and moral 
responsibility of maintaining the Alliance’s nuclear posture and making potential 
nuclear use decisions? 
On non-strategic nuclear weapons, on which the 25 non-nuclear-weapon state NATO Allies will 
have a chance to express their views, the following, rather significant, points need to be made in 
a public discussion which has tended to ignore them. First, there are no promising publicly 
announced technical means to count, track or verify these weapons. Secondly, there is little 
dispute that several thousands of them continue to exist beyond NATO borders across Eurasia. A 
recent estimate published by the Federation of American Scientists put the Russian total for such 
weapons at around 5,000, of which about 2,000 may currently be deployed.[7] 
These inconveniently Realist truths, if voiced effectively enough, may set limits on how far the 
European Allies would feel their security enhanced by any rapid draw down, withdrawal or 
abolition of Western nuclear systems, whether strategic or non-strategic. The cruise and Pershing 
missile crisis in the 1980s showed that NATO leaders were prepared in the comparatively recent 
past to risk major civil disorders because they feared the long-term political and security 
consequences for Alliance nations of living with a gross disparity of short and intermediate range 
nuclear systems, despite the U.S. strategic umbrella. Are there convincing arguments which 
would indicate that this was an entirely quaint twentieth-century concern that has been overtaken 
by events? 
Conclusions: Deterrence and Wider Requirements 
Beyond doctrines, concepts and force structures, the Alliance needs: 
a. To be certain within its government and official structures, and to be able to convince its 
publics, that deterrence is not being privileged at the expense of real possibilities of 
rapprochement and political agreement with potential opponents which could deliver 
satisfactory consensual solutions to international tensions. 
b. Specifically, to prove that examining and strengthening deterrent capabilities and 
policies will not in itself obstruct current Western efforts to promote global movement in the 
direction of disarmament. 
c. To ensure, by a continuous process of analysis and internal agreement, and then prove, 
as discussed above, that there is a well thought out and effectively planned 
interconnection between all relevant levels of deterrence. This means, in practice, that the 
Alliance will commit itself to go through the painful necessary choices to remain relevant. 
That process should certainly involve a considerable improvement in the prediction, 
analysis and planning of appropriate deterrent responses to new and jagged threats. 
d. To demonstrate that it is prepared to move towards transformational change in the 
nuclear field if wider global intentions and achievable non-proliferation outcomes justify it, 
but to remain appropriately cautious in sacrificing capabilities which could not easily be 
restored. 
e. To ensure that opinion makers and decision-makers are sensibly conscious of all the 
deterrent implications of proposed Alliance contributions to disarmament which might 
further increase transatlantic disparities in responsibilities, capabilities, and commitments . 
Apart from accentuating other intra-alliance tensions, as over relative defence 
expenditures, a decision to terminate the nuclear-sharing arrangements based on U.S. 
nuclear weapons in Europe could be expected, over time, to reduce the overall credibility 
of the deterrence which NATO could exert, by undermining its cohesion and making it less 
and less a community of shared security responsibilities-—or, to use the invaluable 
German term: a “Schicksalgemeinschaft”: a shared community of fate . 
f. To become more systematic in determining which strategic arguments can be most 
convincingly put to sceptical Alliance electorates, individually and collectively . The issues 
are surely important enough to justify polling and focus group budgets as large as those 
used to market soap powder in the private sector and to communicate safety regulations in 
the public sector. 
g. To ensure that deterrence is as tailored as possible (which is almost a definitional 
requirement for maximizing its effectiveness) once a potentially threatening antagonist 
begins to emerge, but to appreciate that "tailoring" in itself offers no magic solution. To the 
extent that it represents a departure from long accepted practice "tailoring" will certainly 
require the maintenance of an expensive intelligence knowledge base on a wide range of 
other international actors, but there will remain serious inherent uncertainties about 
motivations, perceptions and precise power relationships within states or groups which the 
Alliance may in future need to deter. 
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